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State and Federal Forfeiture of Property
Involved in Drug Transactions
I. Introduction
Forfeiture of property, which has been used or is intended to be
used to violate, or to facilitate a violation of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act' has become an increas-
ingly formidable weapon in this country's present war against
drugs.2 In addition to these forfeitures effectuated pursuant to the
federal Drug Control Act, almost every state has adopted a statute
which establishes a civil,3 in rem proceeding through which the gov-
ernment may obtain title to "guilty" property." While this is an ef-
1. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-969 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter the Drug Control
Act]. Nearly all states have adopted at least some portions of the federal Drug Control Act to
handle drug control, on a local level, within their own jurisdictions. See generally UNIF. CON-
TROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT §§ 101-607, 9 U.L.A. 187 (1979 & Supp. 1985).
2. Specific forfeiture provisions of the Drug Control Act are contained in 21 U.S.C.A. §
881 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986).
3. While this comment focuses on civil forfeiture, forfeitures may also be criminal in
nature. Criminal forfeiture is in personam and occurs only when there is a conviction against
the property owner. Under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963
(West 1976) (RICO) and under the Drug Control Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1976), prop-
erty may be seized and forfeited after conviction, and the jury will return a special verdict on
the forfeiture. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e).
In a civil forfeiture proceeding the property is seized first, and the court proceeds with in
rem jurisdiction over the property, creating a legal fiction to determine the "guilt" of the res.
Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1981). Guilt or innocence of a
claimed owner is irrelevant in civil forfeiture proceedings, and a criminal prosecution need not
even be brought. See Note, Forfeitures - Civil or Criminal?, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 191 (1970).
4. The following states and territories have civil forfeiture proceedings under their re-
spective drug acts: ALA. CODE § 20-2-93 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.30.100-130 (1983); 21
AM. SOMOA CODE ANN. §§ 2563-65 (Supp. 1979); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82-2629-30
(Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11470. et seq. (West 1986); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-13-501 et seq. (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-246 (West Supp. 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784 (Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-552 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.12 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 79A-828 (Harrison Supp. 1986); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 329-55 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 37-2744 (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
56 '/, § 1505 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-6-8.5-5.1 (West 1981); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 204-505 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4135 (1984); KY, REV.
STAT. ANN. § 218A-27D (Baldwin 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-989.993 (West Supp.
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2387 (Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 22, § 297
(1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94c, § 47 (Supp. 1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (7522)
(Callaghan Supp. 1986); MINN, STAT. ANN. § 152.19 (West Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. §
41-29-153-159 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 19.5140-160 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 44-12-101 et seq. (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28.431 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §
453.301 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:17-b (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:64-1
et seq. (West 1984 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-36 (1980); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 3387-88 (Consol. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-112 (1985); ND. CENT. CODE § 19-
03.1-36 (Supp. 1985): OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.11 (Baldwin 1982) (drugs only); OKLA,
STAT. tit. 63, § 2-503 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.247 (Supp. 1985); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24,
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fective and profitable means to control and deter drug trafficking, the
system lends itself to abuses. Diligence must be used by both state
and federal authorities so that property is not unjustly taken from
innocent owners and third parties and that individual constitutional
rights are not violated.'
Pennsylvania has adopted the Controlled Substance Drug, De-
vice, and Cosmetic Act 6 from the Drug Control Act, making rela-
tively few changes in the statutory language. The specific changes
that were made in the forfeiture sections of the Controlled Substance
Act, however, can and do have a significant impact affecting the
rights of owners, lienholders, and third parties with interests in prop-
erty which may be subject to forfeiture." In general, the rights and
interests of claimants receive more protection when subject to forfei-
ture under the Controlled Substance Act than they would under the
Drug Control Act."
This comment explores forfeitures under the Controlled Sub-
stance Act, comparing and contrasting them with forfeitures under
the Drug Control Act. After providing a brief history of forfeiture
proceedings in general, this comment will examine the following is-
sues through juxtaposition of the two Acts: (1) rights of owners,
lienholders, and third parties; (2) fourth amendment and illegal
seizure; and (3) fifth and fourteenth amendment due process viola-
tions, focusing primarily on the relation back doctrine and the rights
of third parties. Through this examination, gaps and ambiguities in
Pennsylvania forfeiture case law will be resolved by analyzing fed-
eral court rulings that address parallel issues under the Drug Control
Act.
§ 2512 (1979 & Supp. 1983); RI. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-5.04 (1982 & Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-53-520 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-901 (1982 & Supp. 1986); TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15.503 (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37(a)-6
(Supp. 1986) (drugs only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4219 (1982); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
623 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.505 (Supp. 1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
161.55 (West Supp. 1986); and WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1049 (1977).
Authority to institute forfeiture proceedings under the Drug Control Act rests with the
Attorney General. State statutes generally give this authority to district attorneys, or state
Attorneys General, or both. See supra note 2; infra note 7.
5. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
6. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 780-101 to 780-144 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986) [here-
inafter Controlled Substance Act].
7. Specific forfeiture provisions of the Controlled Substance Act are found in 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 780-128 to 780-129 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986).
8. For a detailed comparison of the protection afforded under each of the acts, see infra
notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
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II. A Brief History of Forfeitures
Although sources trace the roots of forfeiture back to early Bib-
lical times, examining its English usage may prove to be more help-
ful in understanding forfeitures in their present legal context.9 Early
in English common law, "the institution of the deodands" was estab-
lished. 10 Deodands were objects causing the death of any creature,
and an in rem type proceeding was brought against the object as the
"guilty" party, which eventually resulted in forfeiture of the object
to the King. 1 Although the deodands were officially abolished in
1846, the common law tradition, and statutory provisions kept the
concept of forfeitures alive for property involved in criminal
activities. 2
The English also had in personam statutory and common law
forfeiture proceedings in which a convicted felon or traitor could
have his real and personal property confiscated.' 3 Forfeiture of prop-
erty was dependent upon a conviction, which is similar to the proce-
dure under current criminal forfeiture statutes;' 4 however, under the
English law, a convicted person's property which was in no way in-
volved in the criminal enterprise was also subject to forfeiture. 15 In
addition to in personam statutory forfeiture, the English continued
to have an in rem, civil proceeding through the Navigational Acts. 16
These acts provided for the forfeiture of property for violations of
customs and revenue laws.'" An owner's guilt was immaterial in
these forfeiture proceedings, and like forfeiture under the Drug Con-
9. Origins of forfeitures are said to be rooted in the Biblical tale of the goring ox, Exo-
dus 21:28, and in the Anglo-Saxon laws of "noxal surrender" which involved a forfeiture of
property which caused death or injury to a person or his family. Finklestein, The Goring Ox:
Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death, and the Western
Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 180-82 (1973).
10. The word "deodand" comes from the Latin term deo dandum, meaning the thing to
be given to God. Finklestein, supra note 9, at 180, n. 35.
II. Id. at 182.
12. In Regina v. Wood, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846), forfeiture of illegally manufac-
tured goods was allowed regardless of the owner's innocence.
13. An attainted felon or traitor would lose his interests in certain property; once lost,
these interests could never be passed to a blood relative. Note, Bane of American Forfeiture
Law - Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 773 (1977).
14. See supra note 3.
15. The reason for such forfeitures was that the criminals had breached the King's
peace; however, forfeitures for convicted felons and traitors were eventually eliminated in Eng-
land by the 1870s. I.W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 298-300 ( ).
16. See L. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EX-
PERIMENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING 387-414 (1964).
17. Forfeiture under customs and navigation statutes was brought in the Exchequer by a
Crown Attorney or by an individual suing qui tam, which is basically an informer's suit. I.M.
BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW, ACTIONS QUITAM 60-62 (6th ed. London 1807)
(Ist ed. London 1736).
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trol Act or Controlled Substance Act, only the wrongful use of the
property was considered by the court in determining whether or not
it should be forfeited. 8
At first, many of the American colonies showed disdain for the
unjust forfeitures and did not adopt them.'9 In fact, some states still
have specific constitutional provisions which prohibit certain kinds of
forfeiture.20 Pennsylvania was one of the few states that did allow
forfeitures through the adoption of specific statutory provisions that
provided for the forfeiture of one half of a felon's property upon con-
viction. While this type of statutory forfeiture has long since been
abandoned, forfeiture of property which is in someway related to an
illegal activity remains a powerful and persistent weapon of govern-
ments. Today, in addition to forfeiture under drug acts, there are
numerous statutes on both the state and federal levels which allow
for forfeiture because of violations of various laws such as gaming
and smuggling.22 Common law forfeiture of contraband also persists
today in most jurisdictions.2
III. Forfeiture Under the Controlled Substance and Drug Control
Acts: Statutory Interpretation
As mentioned above, the Controlled Substance Act was adopted
from the Drug Control Act with minor modifications which signifi-
cantly affect forfeiture law involving drug violations in Pennsylva-
nia.24 This Section explores specific statutory deviation between the
Controlled Substance Act and the Drug Control Act and examines
18. I.W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 261-62.
19. Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law - Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
776, 773 (1977).
20. Id.
21. Acts of Jan. 12, 1705-06, chs. 116, 120, 125, 2 PA. STAT. 172, 178, 184 (H. Flanders
and J. Mitchell eds. 1896).
22. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1592-1624 (West 1976) (forfeiture of smuggled goods and
any vessel, plane, or vehicle used to facilitate smuggling); 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 781-89 (West 1976)
(forfeiture of vessels and vehicles used to transport or conceal any contraband such as drugs,
firearms, and counterfeit money), I.R.C. §§ 7302-7321 (forfeiture of property involved in viola-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code such as items used in gambling, counterfeiting, or distil-
ling); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5513 (Purdon 1977) (forfeiture of gaming devices); 47 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6-601 et seq. (Purdon 1977) (forfeiture of property involved in violations
of liquor laws); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8285 (Purdon 1977) (forfeiture of cigarette vend-
ing machines illegally used).
23. Courts will deem contraband per se, the mere possession of which is illegal, forfeited
under the common law. Petition of Maglisco, 341 Pa. Super. 327, 491 A.2d 1381 (1985). See
also Commonwealth v. Fassnacht, 246 Pa. Super. 42, 369 A.2d 800 (1977); One 1958 Plym-
outh Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). For the distinction between derivative con-
traband and contraband per se, see infra note 28 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
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the basic scope and procedure established by the two Acts. Basically,
the type of property subject to forfeiture and the procedure sur-
rounding forfeitures are the same under both Acts.2 5 It is the availa-
bility of defenses to protect interests in property subject to forfeiture
which distinguishes the Controlled Substance Act from the Drug
Control Act.26 Yet, the differences do not alter the primary purpose
of each Act, namely, to provide a system to control drug traffic and
to deter and prevent drug abuse.27
A. Property Subject to Forfeiture
In deciding what property is subject to forfeiture, courts often
make a distinction between derivative contraband and contraband
per se. Contraband per se is property, the mere possession of which
is illegal, 2 while derivative contraband may be freely possessed
under ordinary circumstances. 29 Both the Controlled Substance Act
and the Drug Control Act provide for automatic forfeiture of all
controlled substances that are considered contraband per se.30 All
property used or intended to be used for manufacturing or conveying
drugs is also forfeitable under both Acts.3 This property, however,
may or may not be automatically forfeitable as contraband per se.32
Each Act also provides for the forfeiture of conveyances, such
as cars, boats, or planes, which are used in, intended to be used in, or
25. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
27. 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 (West 1982). See also United States v. Greenburg, 334 F. Supp.
369 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
28. There is never any right in contraband per se because of a strong public policy
against possessing illegal property. Return is only based on a showing that possessing the prop-
erty does not offend public policy. See Note, Civil Forfeiture and Innocent Third Parties, 3
NORTH. ILL. UL. REV. 323, 336 (1982).
29. Commonwealth v. Fassnacht, 245 Pa. Super. 42, 369 A.2d 800 (1977); One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
30. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(1) (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986) provides
that "(1) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth and no property
right shall exist in them: All drug paraphernalia, controlled substances or other drugs which
have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this act." See 21
US.C.A. § 881(a)(1), (8) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) for parallel federal provisions.
31. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 780-128(a)(2) to -128(a)(3) (Purdon 1977) provides
for forfeiture of:
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used,
or intended for use in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, im-
porting, or exporting any controlled substance or other drug in violation of this
act.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for prop-
erty described in clause (I) or (2) of this subsection.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(2) - (3) (1982) for parallel federal provisions.
32. This will depend on whether or not the property is illegal. See supra note 28.
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facilitate in any way violations of the Acts."3 This is a far reaching
section that provides authorities with a large pool of property con-
ceivably subject to forfeiture.14 Merely intending to use a convey-
ance in violation of either Act may make the property subject to
forfeiture, even though it was never actually used for the intended
purpose.35 Moreover, courts interpreting -these sections have used
broad definitions, thereby permitting forfeiture in tenuous situations
by claiming the conveyances have "facilitated" violation of the
Acts. 6
Recent amendments to the Controlled Substance Act have
greatly expanded the nature and quantity of property which can be
subject to forfeiture. Currently, it is possible for Pennsylvania au-
thorities to seize and forfeit money, negotiable instruments, securi-
ties, other things of value, traceable proceeds, and real property.
37
Such property, except for real estate, has always been forfeitable to
federal authorities under the Drug Control Act, and real estate was
33. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(4) (Purdon 1977) makes the following sub-
ject to forfeiture: "All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used or
are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, re-
ceipt, possession, or concealment of property described in clause (I) or (2)." See 21 U.S.C.A. §
881(a)(4) (West 1982) for parallel federal provisions.
34. If a buyer of drugs uses an automobile to make a purchase, the automobile would be
subject to forfeiture under the Drug Control Act. Although it is clearly unreasonable, and
perhaps cruel and unusual, to forfeit the car merely for buying a small amount of an illegal
substance, it does fall within the language of the Drug Control Act. 21 US.C.A. § 881(a)(4)
(West 1982). It probably would not be forfeited under the Controlled Substance Act, however.
See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
35. Although transporting drugs clearly makes the conveyance subject to forfeiture, if
the government can sustain its burden of proof that such use was merely intended, the forfei-
ture still may be upheld. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text (evidence government
needs to sustain burden of proof).
36. See United States v. One 1971 BMW 4-Door Sedan, 652 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1981)
(automobile used in rendezvous for drug deal was subject to forfeiture under the Drug Control
Act); Commonwealth v. One 1979 Lincoln Four Door Sedan, 344 Pa. Super. 171, 496 A.2d
397 (1985) (car which was used to bring sandwiches and coffee to illegal drug lab was subject
to forfeiture under the Controlled Substance Act); Commonwealth v. One 1981 Volvo Coupe,
89 Pa. Commw. 305, 492 A.2d 485 (1985) (car subject to forfeiture under the Controlled
Substance Act when used for rendezvous).
37. 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(6)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1986) provides for for-
feiture of:
(A) Money, negotiable instruments, securities or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this act.
(B) Proceeds traceable to such an exchange.
(C) Money, negotiable instruments and securities used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of this act.
(D) Real property, including things growing on, affixed to and found in the
land.
See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(6)(i), 881(a)(7) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986) for parallel federal
provisions. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text, for defenses to forfeiture of the
aforementioned property.
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made forfeitable under the 1984 amendments.38 In order for such
property to become forfeitable, state and federal authorities must
show that there is a sufficient nexus between the property and the
illegal activity; i.e., that the property was intended for exchange,
traceable to an exchange, or intended to facilitate violations of the
Acts.3 Additionally, the forfeiture of property under both the Con-
trolled Substance Act and the Drug Control Act is subject to certain
defenses. 0 Yet, despite these limitations, each Act provides state and
federal authorities with extensive authority to seize property. 1
B. Procedure
In order to initiate forfeiture proceedings, the authorities in the
appropriate jurisdiction must first seize the property.42 Both the Con-
trolled Substance Act and the Drug Control Act permit seizure of
any property, without process,'43 if it is incident to an arrest or if
there is probable cause to believe the property was used or intended
to be used in violation of the Acts. Since seizure may occur without
38. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(6), 881(a)(7) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
39. No matter what kind of property is subject to forfeiture, the prosecution must estab-
lish a nexus between the property and the illegal activity. See United States v. One 1977
Cadillac Coupe De Ville, 644 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Kimak, 624 F.2d 903
(9th Cir. 1980).
40. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
41. In 1985, over $1,000,000 in assets were forfeited in Pennsylvania, and over
$300,000,000 was forfeited under the Drug Control Act, which was more than the Drug En-
forcement Agency's (DEA) operating costs. The DEA handles federal forfeitures. See infra
note 43.
42. Under the Drug Control Act, the Attorney General and his agents, who are usually
members of the Drug Enforcement Agency, have the power to seize and commence forfeiture
proceedings. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(b), 881(e) (1982). The profits are placed into a general fund
of the United States Treasury. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(e) (1982). In Pennsylvania either the dis-
trict attorney, if local police make the seizure, or the Attorney General, if state police or
special investigators make the seizure, may take custody of the property. 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 780-128(d) - 780-128(i) (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986). Although 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 831.5 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1986) may suggest that only district attorneys have
authority to initiate forfeitures, this section is implicitly repealed by the Controlled Substance
Act which establishes an entire system of drug control. I PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1971(b)
(Purdon 1977). See also Commonwealth v. One 1967 Pontiac, 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 735 (1974).
43. It is argued that forfeiture is basically a statutory exception to the warrant require-
ment, and unjustly so, giving rise to fourth amendment violations of illegal seizure. See infra
note 128 and accompanying text.
44. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(b) provides the following:
(b) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by the law
enforcement authority upon process issued by any court of common pleas having
jurisdiction over the property. Seizure without process may be made if:
(I) The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search
warrant or inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(2) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior
judgment in favor of the Commonwealth in a criminal injunction or for-
feiture proceeding under this act;
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process, each Act requires that proceedings be instituted "forth-
with,"' 5 and that notice be given to owners and possible claimants in
order to ensure that due process rights are not violated."6
Once notice is given and a petition is filed, the government has
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
property was properly seized and that there is a sufficient nexus be-
tween the property and the illegal activity.47 Upon satisfying this
burden, a prima facie forfeiture case has been established, and the
burden then shifts to the claimant who must disprove either of these
elements48 or assert a defense which would enable him to retain his
interest in the property.49 If the property remains unclaimed follow-
ing notice of seizure, it may be summarily forfeited, and any valid
interest in the property will be lost.50
While forfeitures are civil in form, some courts have held that
the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature due to the punitive and
deterrent aspects of the proceedings.51 This labelling is significant
since courts will extend rights normally belonging to a criminal de-
fendant to claimants in civil forfeiture proceedings. For example, in
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,52 the Supreme Court
(3) There is probable cause to believe that the property is dangerous
to health or safety; or
(4) There is probable cause to believe that the property has been
used or is intended to be used in violation of this act.
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b) (West 1982) for parallel federal citation.
45. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(c) (Purdon 1977) provides that, "In the event
seizure without process occurs, as provided herein, proceedings for the issuance thereof shall be
instituted forthwith." See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881-881(d) (1982) (mandating that procedure for
drug forfeitures follow the same procedure used in customs forfeitures); 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-
1618 (West 1980) (requiring "forthwith" proceedings for customs violations).
46. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-129 (Purdon 1977). Federal notice provisions under
the Drug Control Act are found in customs forfeiture statutes. See infra notes 147-55 and
accompanying text for discussion of possible procedural and substantive due process violations.
47. See Lappas v. Brown, 335 Pa. Super. 108, 483 A.2d 979 (1984); One 1978 Porche
Coupe v. Commonwealth, 70 Pa. Commw. 81, 452 A.2d 603 (1982); Commonwealth v.
Landy, 240 Pa. Super. 458, 362 A.2d 999 (1976). See also United States v. United States
Currency $31,828, 760 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1985); Application of Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219
(D. Mass. 1985); United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V, 453 F. Supp. 1388 (N.Y. 1978).
48. See One 1965 Buick 4 Door Sedan v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. Commw. 189, 408
A.2d 157 (1979). See also United States v. $50,000 United States Currency, 757 F.2d 103
(6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Four Million Two Hundred and Fifty-Five Thousand, 762
F.2d 895 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (claimants must disprove money not related to illegal activities by a
preponderance of the evidence); Annot., 59 A.L.R. FED. 765 (1982).
49. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
50. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-129(c) (Purdon Supp. 1986). Forfeiture occurs
within 30 days of notice to the possessor of the property and advertisement in a newspaper. Id.
See 19 US.CA. §§ 1602-1618 (West 1980) for applicable federal rules.
51. See Commonwealth v. Candy, 240 Pa. Super. 458, 362 A.2d 999 (1976). See also
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
52. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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held that the exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture proceedings,
making illegally seized evidence inadmissible." Additionally, courts
have also held that a claimant may assert his fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination during forfeiture proceedings. 4 By re-
alizing the quasi-criminal nature of forfeitures, courts allow claim-
ants to possibly defeat forfeiture while ensuring protection of their
constitutional rights.55
C. Defenses
It is the availability of more defenses to claimants of property
subject to forfeiture which distinguishes the Controlled Substance
Act from the Drug Control Act. Before any defenses can be asserted
under either the Controlled Substance Act or the Drug Control Act,
a claimant must show that he has standing to challenge the forfei-
ture.56 This usually requires that the claimant show he has a legiti-
mate legal, equitable, or possessory interest in the property being
subjected to forfeiture."'
Under the Drug Control Act, if the property being forfeited is a
conveyance, then the only defenses available to a claimant are: (1)
the conveyance is a common carrier, 58 and (2) the conveyance was
being illegally possessed while it was being used in violation of the
Act." Here, innocence of the owner is irrelevant. 60 Moreover, even if
the conveyance is a common carrier, it is still forfeitable if the gov-
ernment can establish that the owner had knowledge of its illegal
use."' For all other property, including money, negotiable instru-
ments, securities, traceable proceeds, and real estate, owners may
use innocence as a defense under the Drug Control Act and thereby
retain their interest in the property if their defense is successful.62
53. Id. at 696.
54. United States v. United States Coin Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). See also Com-
monwealth v. One 1971 Ford LTD. 245 Pa. Super. 303, 369 A.2d 414 (1976).
55. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text,
56. See United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4), 604 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1979).
57. Id. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. If a claimant wants to allege fourth
amendment or due process violations as a defense, he must obtain standing by showing actual
injury. See Commonwealth v. One 1976 Ford Truck Van, 492 Pa. 541, 424 A.2d 1323 (198 1).
See also infra notes 124-46 and accompanying text.
58. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4)(A) (West 1980). The Controlled Substance Act has a par-
allel common carrier defense. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(4)(i) (Purdon 1977).
59. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4)(B) (West 1980).
60. See United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa.
1979): United States v, Four Million, Two-Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895 (1 Ith
Cir. 1985). See also infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
61. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4)(A) (West 1980).
62. 21 US.CA. § 881(a)(6), 881(d)(7) (West 1980 &'Supp. 1986).
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Unlike the Drug Control Act, the Controlled Substance Act
uniformly allows owners to assert innocence as a defense without
recognizing any distinction between particular types of property.
Thus, the Act avoids the unreasonably harsh result which occurs all
too often under the Drug Control Act when innocent owners are re-
quired to forfeit their property.6" In addition, the Controlled Sub-
stance Act assures holders of bona fide security interests in convey-
ances that their interests are not subject to forfeiture." Finally,
conveyances will not be forfeited under the Controlled Substance
Act if the illegal use giving rise to the forfeiture was mere posses-
sion.65 This eliminates the unjust result, which occurs under the
Drug Control Act, of a person being required to forfeit his car sim-
ply because traces of a controlled substance were found during a
search.86
IV. Rights of Owners and Third Parties
A. Innocent Owners
The harshness of those provisions of the Drug Control Act,
which deny innocence as a defense to the forfeiture of conveyances,
was somewhat tempered by the Supreme Court's decision in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.67 In Calero-Toledo a lessor's
yacht was seized by the Puerto Rican government when the lessee of
63. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(4)(ii) (Purdon 1977), provides that, "(ii) No
conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by reason of any act or omis-
sion established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted without his knowl-
edge or consent;" and 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(6)(ii) (Purdon Supp. 1986)
provides that innocence is a valid defense for all other derivative contraband under the Con-
trolled Substance Act, stating that, "(ii) No property shall be forfeited under this clause to the
extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by the owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." See supra
notes 28-42 for a description of property covered by this section.
64. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(4)(iii) (Purdon 1977) provides that:
(iii) No bona fide security interest retained or acquired under the Uniform
Commercial Code by any merchant dealing in new or used aircraft, vehicles or
vessels, or retained or acquired by any licensed or regulated finance company,
bank, lending institution, or by any other business regularly engaged in the fi-
nancing of, or lending on the security of, such aircraft, vehicles or vessels, shall
be subject to forfeiture or impairment....
65. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(4)(iv) (Purdon 1977) provides that, "(iv) No
conveyance shall be forfeited under this section for violation of clauses (16) and (31) of sub-
section (a) of section 13." Clause (16) is possession of a controlled substance, and clause (31)
is possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana or 8 grains of hashish. 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 780-113(a)(16), 780-113(a)(31) (Purdon 1977).
66. See United States v. 1975 Mercury Monarch, 423 F. Supp. 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(traces of cocaine on a rolled dollar bill, spoon, and vial were sufficient for forfeiture of the car
in which they were found). See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text for a more in-depth
look at possible defenses against forfeiture.
67. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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the yacht was arrested for possession of marijuana. 6 Pursuant to the
Puerto Rican forfeiture statute,"9 the yacht was forfeited without the
lessor ever receiving notice of the proceedings.70
The Supreme Court rejected the lessor's arguments that the for-
feiture violated either his procedural or his substantive due process
rights71 under the fifth amendment. 72 In so holding, however, the
Court in Calero-Toledo stated that a valid constitutional claim could
be maintained if it were shown that the property was taken without
the owner's consent or that the owner had done everything that
could reasonably be expected to avoid the illegal use of the
property. 3
While Calero-Toledo appears to give innocent owners a defense
to forfeiture, which was not specifically provided for within the stat-
ute, it undoubtedly leaves the owner with an insurmountable burden
of proof. Forcing an owner to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that every reasonable step was taken to avoid having his or her
conveyance put to an illegal use is a hole through which no light can
pass. This unfortunate result is simply illustrated by numerous fed-
eral court decisions which have consistently rejected owners' claims
of innocence on the basis that they have failed to meet the burden of
proof necessary in order to fall within the Calero-Toledo
exceptions.74
68. Id. The lessor was the owner of the yacht, and, although the lessee was a drug
dealer, he was not using the boat for smuggling. Id. at 693. A marijuana joint was all that was
found on the yacht. Id.
69. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4) (1979). The Puerto Rican statute is directly
parallel to the forfeiture section of the Drug Control Act from which it was adopted. Conse-
quently, any ruling would have a direct impact on forfeitures under the Drug Control Act.
70. The lessee was properly given notice of the forfeiture under the statute but never
told the lessor; the lessee subsequently never challenged the proceedings himself. Calero-To-
ledo, 416 U.S. at 667.
71. Id. First, the lessor claimed its procedural due process rights were violated because
no pre-seizure notice was given as required by Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 416
U.S. at 668. The Supreme Court refused to extend Fuentes because of the extraordinary cir-
cumstances surrounding forfeiture proceedings. Id. at 669. The Court then found that the
lessor's fifth amendment substantive due process rights were not violated because of the gov-
ernment's legitimate interest in deterring drug traffic and the lessor's lack of diligence. Id. at
687-89. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation."
73. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. The Supreme Court reasoned that the government
had a legitimate interest in preventing and deterring drug traffic. Id. at 688. This interest was
great enough for the Court to impose an affirmative duty on the lessor to make sure its prop-
erty would not be used in violation of drug laws. Id. Since no evidence was offered to prove the
lessor took reasonable steps to meet this duty, the court held that no substantive due process
violations occurred. Id. at 690.
74. See, e.g., United States v. "Monkey," 725 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1984); United States
v. One 1972 Cherokee Jeep, 639 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1976 Merce-
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Fortunately, Calero-Toledo does not directly affect Pennsylva-
nia case law on the forfeiture of conveyances since the Controlled
Substance Act specifically permits innocent owners to retain posses-
sion of their conveyances, thereby providing more constitutional pro-
tection than was required by the Supreme Court. 75 While no Penn-
sylvania appellate courts have specifically addressed this issue, one
common pleas court, in Commonwealth v. One 1970 Fiat Sedan,
6
allowed an innocent joint owner of a car to retain her interest in the
property.17 These factors indicate that forfeiture under the Con-
trolled Substance Act may not result in innocent owners being de-
prived of their conveyances due to their failure to meet an unduly
heavy burden of proof.78
Calero-Toledo becomes an anomaly when considering an inno-
cent owner's interest in other types of property such as money, nego-
tiable instruments, and real estate included within the forfeiture pro-
visions of the Drug Control Act.7 9 Since both Acts allow innocent
owners to retain their interests in properties other than convey-
ances, 80 the issue ultimately becomes whether or not a party with a
legal, equitable, or possessory interest in these properties may be
considered an "owner" within the meaning of the statutes.81
des Benz, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Continental Mark
IV, 584 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1978) United States v. One 1983 Pontiac Grand Prix, 604 F. Supp.
893 (Mich. 1985); United States v. One 1980 Cadillac Eldorado, 603 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); United States v. One 1980 BMW, 559 F. Supp. 382 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). But see United
States v. One 1979 Datsun 280ZX, 720 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. One 1976
Chevrolet Coupe, 477 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 607 (1978).
77. The claimant paid $800 toward the purchase of the $1200 car, and did not know of
the other owner's illegal use of the car. Id. at 610. The car was forfeited and the claimant
received what she had invested. Id.
78. The uniformity of the Controlled Substance Act, allowing innocence as a defense,
suggests its intent may parallel comments made by the Supreme Court in United States v.
U.S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). The Court noted: "When the forfeiture stat-
utes are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only
upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 721-22.
79. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(6)-881(a)(7) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986). Proving innocence
by a preponderance of the evidence is still a heavy burden to meet. See United States v.
$41,305.00 in Currency and Travelers Checks, 802 F.2d 1339 (11 th Cir. 1986) (wife's show-
ing that seized money had an independent source did not meet burden); United States v.
$47,875.00, 746 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1984) (court rejected parents' claim to money given to son
as a joint venture).
80. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(a)(6)-881(a)(7) (West 1980 and Supp. 1987); 35 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1986). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
81. Under the Controlled Substance Act, holders of bona fide security interests, upon a
showing of innocence, retain their interests in conveyances. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-
128(a)(4)(iii) (Purdon 1977).
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B. Innocent Third Parties and the Relation Back Doctrine
The issue of whether or not third parties may be considered
"owners," thereby retaining their interests upon a showing of their
innocence in relation to the property's illegal use, hinges on when the
government obtains title to the property.82 If the government is con-
sidered to obtain title to the property as soon as it is used illegally,
any interests obtained after this time would be inferior to the govern-
ment's interest," even if the third party was totally innocent and
considered within the definition of "owner." '8 It is this notion of the
title to property vesting in the government at the moment of its ille-
gal use which is known as the relation back doctrine.
The Drug Control Act codified the relation back doctrine as
part of its 1984 amendments to the forfeiture provisions.8' The doc-
trine first appeared in United States v. Stowell,86 a case in which the
Supreme Court opined that property interests of illegal distillers
were forfeited upon the commission of the offenses, thereby enabling
the government to avoid claims of intermediate sales and alienations
even as to purchases made in good faith. 87 In Stowell the Court also
found that while the title to the property vests in the United States
at the time the illegal act is committed, title is not perfected until
judicial proceedings deem it forfeited.88 A majority of federal courts
still follow Stowell,8 9 and, in fact, the Supreme Court noted that
Stowell was still good law in Calero-Toledo.9 0
When applying the relation back doctrine, courts simply must
determine whether or not a third party obtained his or her interest in
82. Third parties include such parties as: lienholders, bona fide purchasers for value,
secured parties, assignees, and garnishees.
83. This is based on the reasoning that an individual cannot forfeit an interest to prop-
erty in which he has no rights.
84. The word "owner" is used in defining persons to whom possible defenses may apply,
under both the Drug Control Act and the Controlled Substance Act. 21 U.S.C.A. §§
881(a)(6), 881(a)(7) (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). See also supra note 64.
85. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(h) (West Supp. 1987) provides: "All right, title, and interest in
property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon com-
mission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section."
86. 133 U.S. I (1890).
87. Id. at 16-17. Stowell involved forfeiture of real estate, fixtures, and machine equip-
ment, on which and with which an unregistered still was operated. Id. at II.
88. The Court found that a mortgage obtained before the illegal activity was valid
against the government seizure. Id. at 20.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 91 I, 916 (3d Cir. 1981); Simons v. United
States, 541 F.2d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. One 1967 Chris-Craft 27-Foot
Fiber Glass Boat, 423 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970); Florida Dealers and Growers Bank v.
United States, 279 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. One Piece of Real Estate,
571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
90. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 685.
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the property before it was used illegally. 1 An owner cannot give
away an interest which he does not have.92 This, however, would not
deny a third party standing to challenge forfeiture of property in
which they had an interest.93 If the third party could assert a valid
defense on behalf of the deprived party and successfully defeat the
forfeiture, the government could not perfect its interest, and the
third party would retain his or her interest.
Recently, however, some federal courts have refused to apply
the relation back doctrine to forfeitures under the Drug Control
Act.9 ' The court in Eggleston v. Colorado96 distinguished forfeiture
under the Drug Control Act from that in Stowell by reasoning that
the Stowell decision only applied to mandatory forfeitures while the
Drug Control Act only provided for permissive forfeitures. 96 The
court concluded that the government's interest in the res did not vest
until a judgment for forfeiture in their favor.97
The validity of the opinion in Eggleston is tenuous at best. Not
only is Stowell silent as to the distinction between the applicability
of the relation back doctrine to permissive as opposed to mandatory
forfeiture statutes,9" but Stowell was reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Calero-Toledo, case involving forfeiture under a "permis-
sive" statute.99 Before Stowell the Supreme Court did suggest, in
91. Because seizure and subsequent judicial proceedings merely confirm that title has
absolutely vested in the sovereign and that the forfeiture occurred at the time of the illegal act,
a third party has no interest in the property. Therefore, any transfer occurring after illegal use
is considered invalid. United States v. One Piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D.
Tex. 1983).
92. Id. In fact, the property may be garnished by the government if a third party has
purchased and taken possession of the illegally used property. See Ivers v. United States, 581
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) (forfeiture under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act).
93. See United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276 (9th
Cir. 1983).
94. See United States v. Thirteen Thousand Dollars in United States Currency, 733
F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Currency Totalling $48,318.08, 609 F.2d 210 (5th
Cir. 1980).
95. 636 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Colo. 1986).
96. Id. at 1324. Eggleston involved forfeiture of $1.5 million in currency and 12 one-
ounce gold coins illegally exchanged for cocaine. Id. at 1316. The state of Colorado, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, and the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency all made claims to the prop-
erty. Id.
97. Id. at 1324. The notion of not giving priority to the government's interest until a
judicial decree perfects it is similar to perfection of secured interests under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Since apparent ownership is a core concern of the UCC, it seems plausible that
possession through seizure could occur at the moment the title vests in the government. It
should be noted, however, that the government, unlike secured parties, has a strong interest in
deterring and preventing illegal use of property. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686.
98. 133 U.S. at 10.
99. 416 U.S. at 685.
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United States v. Coffee,100 that the nature and intent of the forfei-
ture statute was relevant in determining when title vested in the gov-
ernment. 10' It is clear, however, as shown by specific statutory lan-
guage in the Drug Control Act, 02 that Congress did intend title to
vest in the government at the moment the property is used
illegally. 03
In Pennsylvania, the relation back doctrine has never been ex-
pressly applied to the Controlled Substance Act. In Commonwealth
v. Myers, 04 the superior court did hold that a defendant, who had
money seized which was intended to be used to purchase a controlled
substance, had no possessory interest in the money as of the date of
seizure105 While this tends to suggest that Pennsylvania courts may
accept the relation back doctrine, the Controlled Substance Act was
not considered in Myers. 06
If faced with the issue, Pennsylvania courts should find, with
certain reservations, that the relation back doctrine is applicable to
the Controlled Substance Act. It is fairly clear that the nature of the
Controlled Substance Act, and the intent of the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture in enacting it, was to deprive owners of all property rights in
any illegally used property at the moment of the illegal use. 07 In
addition, this has been the view held by the Supreme Court'08 and a
majority of federal courts in handling parallel statutes.0 9
Unfortunately, adopting this doctrine does not resolve all the
problems of forfeiture, and in fact, gives rise to new problems. By
applying the relation back doctrine to the Controlled Substance Act,
an innocent third party who has obtained an interest in property af-
ter its illegal use is placed in a position similar to the lessor in
100. 8 Cranch 398 (1814) (Supreme Court found title vested in government at time of
illegal use under customs forfeiture statutes).
101. Id. at 405.
102. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(h) (West Supp. 1987). See supra note 86.
103. While the court in Eggleston was aware of the new statutory provision, it chose to
ignore its implications and look to when the government's interest was finalized. Eggleston,
636 F. Supp. at 1324.
104. 298 Pa. Super. 272, 444 A.2d 1170 (1982).
105. It would be difficult for the government to prove that the money was intended for
an illegal exchange at a date earlier than seizure; consequently, seizure is a convenient date for
the interest to vest.
106. 298 Pa. Super. at 279, 444 A.2d at 1174. The Controlled Substance Act had not
been amended to include money as forfeitable property in 1982.
107. Although the Controlled Substance Act uses the permissive "shall," it not only
states that such property is subject to forfeiture, but it also specifically states that "no property
right shall exist in them." 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(a) (Purdon 1977).
108. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Stowell, 133 U.S. I (1889).
109. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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Calero-Toledo.110 In effect, a duty is placed on the third party to
make sure the property from which they have obtained an interest is
not tainted."1 Thus, the courts should be cautious in using a rigid
application of the relation back doctrine in order to avoid potential
violations of an innocent third party's fifth amendment due process
rights. 112
Violations of a third party's due process rights may also be
avoided by adopting a broad definition of "owners." This would al-
low claimants to assert innocence as a defense and thereby enable
them to retain their interests in the res.113 Permitting a broad defini-
tion of the word "owner" was apparently Congress' intention in en-
acting the Drug Control Act. 1 In addition, courts have placed vari-
ous third parties within the definition of an "owner." For instance,
under the Drug Control Act, lienholders, 5 bona fide purchasers for
value, 1 " and secured parties1 7 have been considered "owners" by
the federal courts. Thus, these third parties were able to assert inno-
cence as a defense to defeat the forfeiture of their interests in prop-
erty that was used illegally. 8 Pennsylvania courts should view the
definition of "owners" in the Controlled Substance Act in a similar
110. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
Ill. It is conceivable that courts could impose the same burden of proof on a third party
as that of the lessor in Calero-Toledo, especially if the third party was not considered an
"innocent owner."
112. These would be substantive due process rights which may be violated. See supra
notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
113. In order to obtain standing to intervene or object to a forfeiture and become a
"claimant," a third party must first assert a legal, equitable, or possessory interest in the prop-
erty. United States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54, 647 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1981). See supra note
58.
114. See United States v. One Piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Tex.
1983).
115. Id. After finding that a lienholder was properly included within the definition of
"owner," the court held that upon the claimant's assertion of innocence, he could retain his
property interest (but not equity built up in the interest) from the time of seizure to forfeiture.
Id. at 726.
116. See United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276
(9th Cir. 1983).
117. See United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d
895 (11 th Cir. 1985). While the court did not recognize holders of checks written on a for-
feited bank account, this was because they were not considered a legal or equitable assignment
under the U.C.C. Id. at 907. This suggests that a holder of such a legal or equitable interest
would be considered an "owner." In addition, the court placed the burden on the claimant to
prove an "actual" absence of knowledge, not constructive knowledge. Id. at 906.
118. Remission is another way an innocent third party may retain his interest in for-
feited property. This post-seizure relief, however, is totally under the government's discretion.
The federal power is given to the Attorney General and is derived from customs laws, 19
U.S.C.A. § 1618 (1982). In Pennsylvania, remission is determined by the party seeking forfei-
ture. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-129(c) (Purdon 1977). It should be noted that this same
section provides standing for lienholders and other third parties. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
780-129 (Purdon 1977).
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fashion, thereby protecting the substantive due process rights of in-
nocent third parties.
V. Constitutional Issues
An in-depth discussion of all the constitutional issues which
arises during forfeiture proceedings is outside the scope of this com-
ment. Such issues, however, have been the source of much litigation
and commentary. The main constitutional concerns surrounding for-
feiture proceedings are illegal search and seizure, 1 9 due process
rights,120 and self-incrimination rights.'21 While forfeitures are civil
actions, they are quasi-criminal in character, and an owner of seized
property will receive the full panoply of rights enjoyed by a criminal
defendant.122
A. Fourth Amendment Issues
The various ways in which the federal courts have dealt with
alleged fourth amendment violations as a defense to defeat forfeiture
has lead to confusion and inconsistency in interpretation of the Drug
Control Act. 2 ' The federal courts have found two ways of dealing
with fourth amendment violations which occur during the seizure of
property subject to forfeiture: (1) any evidence, including the res it-
self, may be suppressed 2 " and (2) the forfeiture itself may be de-
feated. 2 5 Both the Drug Control Act and the Controlled Substance
Act provide that seizure only requires probable cause that the prop-
erty was used in violation of the Act. 26 Read literally, this approach
can have the effect of creating a statutory exception to the warrant
requirement. 12
7
119. See Hollmann, Forfeitures and the Fourth Amendment, 5 CRIM. JUST. J, I (1981);
Note, The Forfeiture Exception To the Warrant Requirement: A Distinction Without a Dif-
ference, 67 VA. L. REV. 1035 (1981); Note, Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment-Illegal
Seizure of Derivative Contraband Bars Forfeiture, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 705 (1982).
120. See Note, Civil Forfeiture and Innocent Third Parties, 3 NORTH. ILL. L, REV. 323
(1983); Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Pro-
ceedings Arising out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE L.J. 822 (1984).
121. See Annot., 76 L. Ed. 852 (1985).
122. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
123. Although no cases have arisen in Pennsylvania under the Controlled Substance
Act, case law may be extrapolated from federal rulings since the statutes are parallel.
124. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
125. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). This, however,
would occur because the government could not support its burden on independent evidence.
See Interbartolo v. United States, 303 F.2d 34 (Ist Cir. 1962).
126. See supra note 45.
127. United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966) (evidence found during
warrantless search deemed admissible since probable cause existed for seizure).
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In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,128 the Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeitures be-
cause of their quasi-criminal nature.12 9 While this may have the ef-
fect of defeating the forfeiture, the more reasonable approach seems
to be that it should not do so per se. 30 Thus, if the government can
prove through independent sources that the property was used in vio-
lation of the Act, forfeiture should be granted. 31
Before determining whether a forfeiture should be defeated or
not, courts must first determine what constitutes an illegal seizure
for fourth amendment purposes. Clearly, the seizure is unconstitu-
tional absent probable cause that the property was used unlaw-
fully. 132 The question then becomes whether or not a warrant is re-
quired for the seizure. More specifically, courts must struggle with
the question of whether or not a warrant is required for the seizure
of property in the absence of exigent circumstances. 33
In most circumstances, a warrant is not required for seizure
pursuant to forfeiture statutes when it is based on probable cause. 3
A single exception, recognized by a minority of courts, is that absent
exigent circumstances a warrant should be acquired before
seizure.1 35 The majority of federal courts have simply relied on the
specific statutory language of the Drug Control Act, which allows
for forfeiture without process when based on probable cause, regard-
128. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
129. Id. at 701. Illegally seized evidence, then, is inadmissible during forfeiture and
criminal proceedings. Id.
130. United States v. One Harley Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1974).
131. John Bacall Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 412 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969). The
exclusionary rule deals only with the admissibility of evidence, and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
merely stated illegally obtained evidence is excluded. It did not suggest that illegality resulted
in the automatic defeat of the forfeiture. In addition, obtaining a conviction from independent
sources is an integral part of criminal constitutional law. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
133. In Commonwealth v. Fassnacht, 246 Pa. Super. 42, 369 A.2d 800 (1977), the supe-
rior court found that seizure of derivative contraband without a warrant was unconstitutional.
This holding is not applicable to the Controlled Substance Act for it did not examine whether
the government had probable cause; nor did it discuss the statutory granting of such a seizure.
See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
134. See United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297
(5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bush,
647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Kimak, 624 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. One 1976 Lincoln Continental Mark IV, 584 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1978).
135. See United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. McMi-
chael, 541 F. Supp, 956 (D. Md. 1982).
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less of exigent circumstances.' These courts also argue that there is
not as great an expectation of privacy involved with the seizure of
property 3 7 and that the government has a greater interest in the res
because of its property rights.1 3 8 In addition, some federal courts ar-
gue that the "forfeiture" exception is merely one of the many excep-
tions not hinging on exigent circumstances."'
While Pennsylvania courts have not decided this issue as ap-
plied to the Drug Control Act, they should not be reluctant to adopt
the minority view.' 40 Requiring a warrant when there are no exigent
circumstances justifying seizure allows the courts to exercise a mini-
mal amount of judicial scrutiny before seizure without inconvenience
to the Commonwealth."" This ultimately would aid in assuring
claimants the full panoply of protections afforded a defendant in a
criminal case.
Another fourth amendment issue involves warrantless searches
after a lawful seizure. A warrantless search conducted after a lawful
seizure has been allowed by the federal courts under the Drug Con-
trol Act. 4 These searches are considered constitutional because the
property is in the lawful possession of the authorities during the
search. 3 Such searches, however, may be limited to inventory
searches and should not encompass investigatory searches.'" Again,
while Pennsylvania courts have not addressed this issue, federal
court interpretation should provide adequate guidance in the event
the issue arises.
136. United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981) (warrantless seizure of defend-
ant's automobile was proper as court saw no reason to deviate from literal reading of the
statute).
137. Id. at 369. This is derived from the automobile exception to the warrant require-
ment. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
138. United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297, 1302
(5th Cir. 1983).
139. United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982). Exceptions include: United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (automobile search); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976) (arrests); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (plain view); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) (exigent circumstances).
140. See United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324 (Ist Cir. 1980). In Pappas the court
reasoned: (I) since the first three exceptions (21 U.S.C.A. §§ 780-128(b)(1),(2) and (3)
(1980)) to the warrant requirement in the Drug Control Act require exigency, it should be
required for probable cause; and (2) the relation back doctrine may apply to property interests,
but not to individual liberties, and while privacy interests may be lessened they still exist and
should be protected. Id. at 329-30.
141. Interpreting the Controlled Substance Act as requiring a warrant, except when
there are exigent circumstances, would protect it from constitutional attacks. See United
States v. One-Hundred Twenty-Eight Thousand Thirty-Five Dollars, 628 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) (parts of Drug Control Act unconstitutionally violate fourth amendment).
142. United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1978).
143. Id. at 233.
144. Id. at 234.
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B. Due Process
Violations of both substantive and procedural due process rights
might be involved in forfeiture proceedings. Procedural due process
claims have centered on the lack of pre-seizure and post-seizure pro-
cedures,1" 5 while substantive claims are based on the government's
taking property without just compensation.' 6 The Supreme Court in
Calero-Toledo has unequivocally ruled that pre-seizure notice is not
required in forfeiture proceedings because of the extraordinary cir-
cumstances surrounding them. 4 7 The Court in Calero-Toledo also
found that an innocent owner's substantive due process rights could
be violated if not given the opportunity to retain his interest in the
forfeited property. 48
Both the Drug Control Act and the Controlled Substance Act
require the hearing to be brought "forthwith."' 49 Although unlikely,
an unreasonable delay between seizure and the date of hearing could
defeat the forfeiture.' 50 In determining whether or not the delay be-
tween the actual forfeiture and the hearing is unreasonable, both
federal and Pennsylvania courts look to the reasons for delay and the
prejudice to the defendant.' 5' Delays of over one year have been
found constitutionally valid.'52
C. Self-Incrimination
A claimant may invoke his privilege against self-incrimination
during a forfeiture proceeding. 5 a Both federal and Pennsylvania
courts have defeated the forfeiture of property when a claimant was
forced to choose between the loss of his property or implicating him-
145. See infra notes 148-149.
146. These claims are based on fifth amendment rights. See supra notes 72-74 and ac-
companying text.
147. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 677.
148. Id. at 688. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
149. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-128(c) (Purdon 1977) (section 780-129 provides
for further procedural requirements). See supra note 46 for parallel federal provision derived
from customs laws.
150. United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555
(1983).
151. Id. at 566-69. See also Commonwealth v. One 1979 Lincoln, Four Door Sedan,
344 Pa. Super. 171, 496 A.2d 397 (1985); Commonwealth v. One 1981 Volvo Coupe, 89 Pa.
Commw. 305, 492 A.2d 485 (1985); Commonwealth v. One 1976 Oldsmobile Cutlass Su-
preme, 85 Pa. Commw. 433, 482 A.2d 696 (1984); One 1965 Buick 4 Door Sedan v. Com-
monwealth, 46 Pa. Commw. 180, 408 A.2d 157 (1979).
152. See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S.
555 (1983).
153. Annot., 76 L. Ed. 849 (1985).
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self as to alleged criminal activities."" Consequently, it is not un-
usual for the government to delay forfeiture hearings until after the
criminal trial of a possible claimant.
VI. Conclusion
Forfeitures have a long and dark past, yet they continue to be a
powerful force in seizing property used in violation of the law. The
Drug Control Act and the Controlled Substance Act create issues,
such as the validity of the relation back doctrine, which are as ripe
today as they were in 1889. While this may reflect insubstantial
gains in individual rights, statutory language and case law can be
established to protect constitutional rights. In Pennsylvania, the Con-
trolled Substance Act does protect innocent owners' rights. Further-
more, when interpretation of caselaw is needed, the state courts can
draw from federal decisions under the Drug Control Act. In so do-
ing, the Pennsylvania courts have the power to prevent fourth
amendment illegal search and seizures and fifth amendment due pro-
cess violations.
John Brew
154. See United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. One 1971 Ford LTD, 245 Pa. Super. 303, 369 A.2d 414 (1976).

